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In fact, it is hardly possible to sum up events that are still in process. This refers to a long list of events
that occurred in 2001 – primarily given the forthcoming key political event of 2002, the parliamentary
elections. Naturally, the forthcoming elections determined the hidden and open political battles
between various political forces and financial-industrial groups.
The Ukrainian politics stopped being a lottery, and nobody expects political improvisation. Potential
and actual rivals fight for their election “strongholds” and accumulate force for the final race. In 2001
the “battles” were fought in the best traditions of political survival tactics: some sought to keep their
positions, others wanted to stay in politics, still others planned political expansion and attacks on their
competitors. The competition occurred at all levels – from businesses to the national government, from
parliament to individual regions. Even such a specific “political” area as football was not beyond
politics, let alone education, health care, trade unions, etc.
The purpose and the prize of the competition was access to the notorious “administrative resource” -
levers of influence and possibility to use various, primarily state-owned, resources. The administrative
resource is believed to allow to "make" the election results well before the polling day. The tension of
the process can be accounted for by the fact that within the recent four years the number of potential
claimants of the “administrative resource” has grown substantially.
Struggle for votes did not show originality. Parties and blocks engaged in a variety of public activism -
from giving away food packages in rural areas to sponsoring show business stars and paying for TV
shows. Here we do not discuss how relevant such activities are for a standard role a political party
plays in a democracy. The effectiveness of that kind of activism can be illustrated by results of a recent
opinion poll conducted by the Ukrainian Institute of Social Research and the Social Monitoring Center
in December 2001: 60% of the respondents noticed no activity of political parties at all, while 26% saw
“some” activity and 5% noticed high level of political activity of parties and blocks.
In 2001, the parliament and the president spent a lot of time on determining new rules of the election
race. The “stumbling block” was the election law, and finally President Kuchma won that round of the
game. Advocates of the proportional system failed to have their version of the law, and also failed to
convince the president to accept the compromise: 25% of MPs to be elected in majoritarian
constituencies, and 75% to be elected through party lists. As a result, we are having an old 50:50
system, which in principle may conserve the situation in the parliament and prevent political rotation.
The relations between branches of power were traditionally difficult. The first part of 2001 was shaken
by a parliament-government crisis caused by rivalry between different political actors. The crisis had a
strong flavor of the 2004 presidential elections, rather that the 2002 parliamentary race, and culminated
in the dismissal of Victor Yushchenko and his government on April 26, 2001, by the parliament’s no-
confidence vote.
Actually, the crisis began to simmer at the beginning of 2001, and then was enhanced by the division of
the parliamentary majority into the “pro-government” and the “pro-presidential” parts. The former
included factions of the two Rukhs, the Reforms-Congress, the Batkivshchyna, and part of the Greens.
The latter was represented by the SDPU(o), the Vidrodzhennya Rehioniv, the Trudova Ukraina, the
People’s Democratic party, later joined by the Regions of Ukraine and the Solidarity. Hence, the
majority that had emerged from the “velvet revolution” of early 1999 (that had removed Communists
and other left-wingers from key positions in the parliament) ceased to exist and was reduced to a myth,
though officially none of 281 MPs withdrew from the majority. Political mutations had their impact on
the parliamentary majority that adopted different configurations and was branded differently in the
media: from the “communo-oligarchic” majority that “made the Yushchenko government resign” to the
“communo-nationalist” that ousted his rival Victor Medvedchuk from his position of First Vice
Speaker on December 13, 2001. Commenting on Medvedchuk’s dismissal, Yushchenko argued that
was “horse-trading with political course in order to unite the left and financial-oligarchic circles”
(UNIAN, April 19, 2001). The press service of the SDPU(o) condemned the dismissal of their leaders
as the “alliance” of “communists and nationalists”. The rivals’ rhetoric only underlined the end of the
process that symbolically buried the parliamentary majority.
In 2001, the long-debated idea of creating a coalition government was not realized again, though it was
one of the key points of the March 2001 conflict between the government and the parliament.
Paradoxically, the phrase “coalition government” emerged from the Cabinet of Ministers – according to
official representative of the Government in the parliament Serhiy Sobolev, who said: “unfortunately,
and I admit that, the phrase “coalition government” came from the building of the Cabinet of
Ministers” (Kyivsky Telegraph, February 5, 2001). Numerous consultations between the government
and the parliament about shared responsibility failed to bring consensus between different political
groups and branches of power. Yushchenko stated that “the government was not politically authorized
by anyone to form a coalition government, this is not logical, because the whole motivation for
formation of a coalition government goes primarily through the formation of a coalition itself (UNIAN,
March 2, 2001). The ideal of a coalition government was initiated in the parliament by the SDPU(o)
and supported by the Trudova Ukraina. The failure to agree on it can be seen as one of the reasons for
the dismissal of the Yushchenko government.
The idea of a coalition government as a modification of political responsibility for the situation in the
state was not implemented in the government of Anatoly Kinakh either. Kinakh, appointed to the
position of prime minister following the votes of 239 MPs on May 29, 2001, kept most of the
“inherited” government. Most of ministers of the Yushchenko government were re-appointed, and
former vice prime minister for the fuel and energy complex Oleg Dubina was promoted to the position
of the first vice prime minister.
A specific political innovation of 2001 was the introduction, in the context of the stumbling
administrative reform, of the institution of state secretaries by President Kuchma’s decree on May 29.
Accoridng to the decree, sate secretaries are appointed and dismissed by the President, which gives him
additional influence on the government in conditions when the law on the Cabinet of Ministers is
missing – a law that could settle relations between the government andthe parliament and provide
answers to a number of other questions.
Notwithstanding the ruination of the partliamentary majority, the parliament managed to approve the
Criminal Code and the Land Code that had been stored for years. The Land Code, dubbed as the “Land
Constitution”, was approved regardless of conflicting views on the issues of land privatization and the
ways of addressing agrarian problems, regardless of the massive rally organized by the left-wingers.
The land Code was approved by 232 votes.
The past year was marked by the launch of a few political projects and political brand names, some of
them rather successful, others hardly remembered at all. For instance, few remember the establishment
of the Ukrainian Pravytsya on january 21, 2001, though the foundation forum of the block gathered
almost 1,000 participants representing 11 political parties and 20 NGOs, including the Ukrainian
People’s Rukh (Kostenko), Batkivshchyna, the Ukrainian Republican Party, Sobor, the Social-naitonal
Party, the Christian People’s Union, the Party of Support of national Manufacturers, Ukrainian
Cossacks, the Prosvita, the Union of Ukrainian Officers, the Young Rukh, the All-Ukrainian
Association of Veterans, the Ukrainian Students’ Union, etc.
Some political projects proved to be rather logical and successfulfrom the perspectice of involvement
in the election race. The year of lasting political positioning and migration, 2001 was the year of
competition of some political forces in the regions, and regioanl elites built up muscles in relations with
the center. It proved to be increasingly difficult to dismiss a regional official simply by command from
the official Kyiv. Heads of regional state administrations (routinely referred to as “governors”),
particularly in industrially strong Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv, begin playing their own
political games.
2001 was the year of arrival of the powerful Donetsk “clan” to the front scene of Ukrainian politics,
reflected in the emergence and growth of influence of a primarily regional party that claims to be
national, the Party of the Regions. The party was formed on March 3, 2001 from a rather amorphous
formation: a party of Regional Renaissance “Working Solidarity of Ukraine”. At the end of March
2001, a parliamentary faction (!) “Regions of Ukraine” was formed . Nine out of seventeen of its
members have their political and business roots in the Donetsk region. The party has experienced a
change of leadership lately: its initial chiarman, head of the State Taxation Administration Mykola
Azarov resigned in December 2001, and Vice Prime Minister Semynozhenko took over. The Donetsk
political “elite” is increasingly aggressive and successful in storming its way to the top. The recent
acheivement of the Donetsk lobby at the end of December 2001 was the appointment of member of the
Party of the Regions, meber of the Board of the National Bank of Ukraine and member of the Regions
of Ukraine Igor Yushchko, MP, to the position of Minister of Finance of Ukraine. Just a couple of
weeks before Mr. Yushchko was appointed to the position of state secretary of the Ministry of Finance.
Before becoming an MP in 1998, he chaired the Donetsk-based First Ukrainian International Bank.
Hence, the Donetsk group is now in control of both the revenue part of the national budget (through the
State Taxation Administration, still chaired by Azarov) and the expenditure part (through the Ministry
of Finance), which is particularly important in the pre-election context.
There are a number of other political brands whose authors claim significant roles in the future
parliament and, possibly, in the 2004 presidential elections. These include the block of “parties of
power”, “Za Yedynu Ukrainu”. At the end of November 2001, presidential chief of staff Volodymyr
Lytvyn became the leader of that block, and Prime Minister Kinakh joined the block as number two.
The formal agreement between the members of the block was signed on December 15, but discussions
about details continue. The block includes the Trudova Ukraina, the Party of the Regions, the PDP, the
Agrarian Party, and the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. Hence, the block’s list will include
top executive officials of this state: Prime Minister Kinakh (Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs),
Vice Prime Minister Volodymyr Semynozhenko (Party of the Regions), Minister of transportation
Valery Pustovoitenko (leader of the PDP), Minister of Agrarian Policy Ivan Kyrylenko (member of the
Agrarian party), and, possible, Vice Prime Minister Leonid Kozachenko (member of the Agrarian
party). Under the new election law, state officials and civil servants do not have to take a leave when
running for parliament. Therefore, there is little doubt which of the candidates and blocks will be
favored by local bureaucrats.
A strong political force that will be taking part in the elections and hopes to receive the “control
package” of shares in the next parliament is Victor Yushchenko’s Nasha Ukraina. The block includes
the two Rukh parties (led by Udovenko and Kostenko), the Party Reforms and Order, Solidarnist, and a
number of smaller parties and NGOs. However, the final election list of the block still remains to be
seen.
Another actor is BYuTi (pronounced in Ukrainian as “Beauty”), the block of ex-vice-prime minister
ofthe Yushchenko government Yulia Tymoshenko. The ByuTi is, in fact, a remake of the National
Salvation Forum, the structure established on July 11, 2001 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna,
and a number of small parties like “Sobor”, the Ukrainian Republican Party, the Ukrainian Social
Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Conservative Republican
Party, and the Patriotic Party. The block declares opposition to the president and thegovernment. It is a
quastion whetherthe block will manage to do well in the elections and overcome the 4% barrier without
access to the media and support from local authorities. The BYuTi represents the forces that positioned
themselves in the “tapegate” but lost momentum in 2001. The last tent camp was removed from the
cetral square of Kyiv on March 1, 2001. Today the opposition is divided and week, and the government
and the presidential power are basically the same as before the events of November 28, 2000.
Lat year also brought a new stage of rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia, as well as
conservation of relations with the European Union. Russia announced 2002 to be the year of Ukraine
and promised to take part in financing the construction of the Khmelnytsky and the Rivne nuclear
power plants. In December 2001, at least two significant Ukrainian-Russian events took place: the
congress of ethnic Ukrainians in Moscow and the meeting of Ukrainian and Russian businessmen in
Kharkiv. Shortly before the end of the year Russia and Ukraine finally signed an agreement on transit
of the Russian gas throug the territory of Ukraine in 2002. The dialogue, therefore, is likely to continue.
Meanwhile, according to the recent opinion poll conducted by the Ukrainian Institute of Social
Research and the Social Monitoring Center on December 13-21, 2001, Ukrainians believe that the top
events of 2001 were “appointment of the new prime minister”, “10th anniversary of Ukraine’s
independence”, “the Pope’s visit”, “the destruction of a civilian plane by the Ukrainian missile” and
“the census” (each mentioned by 10-12% of the respondents). 56% believed that the key event of the
year was the terrorist attack on the USA.
Anyway, the 2001 events will shape the social and political landscape in 2002. The long list of
unanswered questions will have to be addressed both by the people and the government – the former at
the polling stations, the latter in the race for votes. We wish the choice were conscious and the race
were fair. However, the 2001 realities suggest that the wishes may be over-optimistic.
